South Sudan Peace Agreement August 2015

The SPLM/A-IG also opposed the transfer of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM), responsible for reporting on progress in the implementation of the permanent ceasefire and interim security agreements (PCTSA), to the monitoring mechanism for ceasefire and interim security agreements (CTSAMM). Mr. Kiir objected to MVM`s role and argued that its current performance was not satisfactory, as its reports were based on unofficial information, which also suggests that the transition from MVM to CTSAMM should only be based on government authorization. While over-reliance on unofficial information or statistics in security reports can undermine peace efforts — since such information is often exaggerated and manipulated to pursue narrow interests — there is no justification for eliminating anything that can be useful and positive. It would appear that the work of CTSAMM is overseen by a more independent and representative Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), as provided for in Chapter VII (2.7) of the ARCSS. Therefore, progressive and constructive discussions should focus on strengthening the JMEC`s ability to carry out its oversight function, rather than considering government interference in MVM`s transition. This can be potentially destructive given the scale of political polarization in South Sudan. Mr. Machar signed the peace agreement on August 17 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but Mr.

Kiir refused and condemned it as unjust and unsustainable. In the face of widespread international pressure and the threat of an arms embargo, Kiir relented on Wednesday. The previous challenge is related to the agreement`s failure to address some of the causes of the conflict in South Sudan. Among the most serious causes of the conflict, as found in the final report of the 2014 African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, are the lack of strong democratic institutions and the continued mix of personal, ethnic and national interests, as well as the inequitable distribution of resources in South Sudan.10 Chapter 1 Transitional institution and mechanism provisions; and chapter 4 The provisions on resource, economic and financial management — which together attempt to address some of the causes of the conflict — have long been enshrined in previous peace agreements, but have not brought about any change. R-ARCSS mediators needed to understand why this was the case and develop more innovative and creative interventions. Of course, it must be acknowledged that, in some cases, progress has been made. . . .